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The National Childcare Strategy: The
social regulation of lone mothers as
a gendered reserve army of labour
Chris Grover
This paper analyses the introduction of the National
Childcare Strategy. It argues, in the context of
workfarism and through a new evaluation of the
‘women as reserve army’ thesis, that the National
Childcare Strategy can be understood as one of a
number of administrative mechanisms in New
Labour’s welfare reform agenda that aims to release
lone mothers from social reproduction, in order to
increase their effectiveness at competing for paid
employment. This approach to the provision of
childcare means that the state is heavily involved in
subsiding childcare markets, benefiting capital
through socialised reproduction, and through the
rewards of what can be lucrative childcare markets.
Introduction
New Labour’s National Childcare Strategy () wasoutlined in Meeting the Childcare Challenge(Secretary of State for Education and Employment
et al., ). The  was introduced by New Labour as a
market-led approach to addressing the lack of childcare
provision in England. As such, it might be held up as a
‘Third Way’ approach to the delivery of childcare, for it is
structured through several features—including the state
working in ‘partnership’ with the private and voluntary
sectors; the state regulating, but not directly providing, public
goods; and the state ‘working to provide public goods (such
as childcare, education and training) to underpin greater
equality of opportunity’—that are held to be part of a ‘third
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way approach to public policy’ (Driver & Martell, :
). However, it has been observed (for example, Callinicos,
) that while ‘Third Way’ is used to describe an approach
said to be beyond both the old left and the new right, it is
actually concerned with buttressing neoliberalism. This paper
develops the Callinicos argument by examining how the
 as an area of social policy is aimed, at a general level, at
consolidating neoliberalism while, more specifically,
encouraging newly-important childcare markets through
various forms of subsidisation.
The importance of childcare in allowing women with
dependent children to take paid employment has been
observed for many years (Martin & Roberts, ; Brown,
; Bradshaw & Millar, ; Ford, ; Dex & Joshi,
); and while it has been pointed out that there are still
problems with the costs of, and access to, childcare (Rake,
), and more fundamental issues related to the
assumptions that frame the design and delivery of the  in
its wider context of New Labour’s welfare reform agenda
(for example, Duncan & Edwards, ; Wheelock & Jones,
), there is also recognition of the potential of the  to
improve the well-being of particularly children. Pacey (),
for example, focuses on the potential of the  to help
New Labour in its aim of abolishing child poverty, a point
also made by Rowlingson and McKay (: ).
What these analyses do not capture is the importance
attached to the  in terms of managing economic stability.
The aim of this paper is to address this issue, and to provide
a political economy of the  by focusing on the regulatory
functions of the  in the management of neoliberalism. It
does this by examining the introduction and development
of the  through a regulation approach analytical
framework, in which it is possible to explore the role of
social policy in the governance of capital accumulation.
Before examining the analytical framework, we need to
brieﬂy examine the components of the .
The National Childcare Strategy
Meeting the Childcare Challenge argued that there were three
problems with childcare in England: it was not of consistent
quality, there was not enough of it, and it was not aﬀordable.
The aim, therefore, was to ‘ensure good quality, aﬀordable
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childcare for children aged  to  in every neighbourhood’
(Secretary of State for Education and Employment et al.,
: ). While defining ‘quality childcare’ is deeply
problematic (see Moss & Pence, ), New Labour felt
that it could deal with the issue of quality through a
combination of the integration of early-years education and
childcare provision; a more consistent regulatory regime
covering early-years education and childcare; the provision
of Early Excellence Centres to disseminate good practice;
and the development of a less complex training and
qualification framework for childcare workers (ibid.). Over
the past five years, there have been developments in relation
to these. So, for example, the regulation of early-years
education and childcare has been brought together at the
Department of Education and Skills, and there has been
work ‘to rationalise and simplify the many existing
qualifications [for childcare workers] into a new framework
of nationally accredited qualifications’ (Moss, : ).
However, it is recognised that early-years services are still
structured through a fragmentation of thinking which
separates education from care (Moss, ).
While the issue of quality has some importance for our
purposes—parents will not use childcare services if they do
not have confidence that they are of a good standard—what
is of more concern is the amount of childcare and its
aﬀordability. To increase the amount of childcare, the
government has focused upon both supply- and demand-
side policies. On the supply side, funding has been made
available through the  for ‘pump-priming’ childcare
services (investing in the hope of inducing self-sustaining
expansion), particularly for out-of-school care and more
recently, as we shall see, for nursery provision in poorer
neighbourhoods. Much of this funding has come from the
National Lottery-sponsored New Opportunities Fund. On
the demand side, developments have come through New
Labour’s ‘making work pay agenda’, for the mechanisms—
increased child benefit and the Working Families Tax Credit
() (now the Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit)—
are held to have made childcare more aﬀordable (Secretary
of State for Education and Employment et al., ). As
part of the ‘making work pay’ agenda, New Labour also
introduced the Childcare Tax Credit  as a subsidy for
registered childcare. As we shall see, the  was introduced
as a financial incentive for lone mothers to take paid
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employment. However, it is also the main demand-side
stimulus for increased childcare provision, since it aims to
put childcare within the financial reach of parents with lower
incomes, thereby creating further demand for childcare
services.
Whether the  has been successful in creating more
and more aﬀordable childcare is debatable. The government
claims that by  it will have created a million new childcare
places for . million children (Department for Education
and Skills, ), although its basis for calculation is unclear.
That said, there is evidence of market-specific increases in
childcare provision, but the increases tend to pre-date the
introduction of the . So, for example, it is estimated that
there were , day nurseries providing , places in
, increasing to , providers and , places in
 (National Statistics, : ). This increase has been
driven by an increase in the number of private day-nursery
providers, since the number of local authority-provided day
nurseries actually decreased between  and . The
other main source of full day care—childminders—has seen
a dramatic fall in the number of providers and places oﬀered
in recent years. This decline started in , and has therefore
not been checked by the . The number of out-of-school
providers has increased from around  in  to , in
 (National Statistics, : ).
There are spatial issues in relation to the distribution of
childcare. The main concern is whether the private sector
can ‘deliver aﬀordable, high quality and sustainable childcare
in every part of the country, including to the two-thirds of
poor children who do not live in the most deprived areas’
(Land, : ). Land does see grounds for optimism.
However, the Neighbourhood Nurseries Initiative ()
makes it clear that New Labour sees the private sector as
being the childcare saviour of poorer parents.
The aim of the  is to fulfil the ‘Government’s ambition
… for every lone parent living in a disadvantaged area to
have a childcare place when they enter work’ (Department
for Education and Skills, : ), thereby meeting the needs
of ‘thousands of lone parents and low income families [who]
still feel that their childcare commitments stop them from
working’ (Department for Education and Skills, : ).
The  aims to create , places in  neighbourhood
nurseries with £ million made available by the Depart-
ment for Education and Skills and the New Opportunities
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Fund (Department for Education and Skills, ).
However, McCalla et al. (: ) question whether the
private sector can resolve the childcare problems of poorer
neighbourhoods, for the ‘assumption remains unchallenged
that with a little pump-priming, the market, in all its diversity,
can be manipulated to meet government targets for childcare
places’.
There is also little evidence to suggest that the  has
actually made the cost of childcare more aﬀordable. So, for
example, the Daycare Trust has calculated that between 
and , the cost of childcare increased by  per cent
(Bolton, ). This should not be particularly surprising,
for the price of childcare is being maintained by the high
level of demand for it and, some evidence suggests, an
upward adjustment in the charges of childcare providers
because of the ability of parents to claim  (cf. McCalla
et al., : ).
The success or otherwise of the  should not be a
distraction for us. What is clear is that New Labour sees the
 as being an important social policy mechanism. Our
task is to understand, in the context of the ‘workfarist’ shifts
that have been visible in British social policy for a decade
or so, the reasons for its introduction.
Social regulation and workfarism
It is now widely recognised that economic regulation is
firmly embedded in social institutions and processes. Drawing
upon the French regulation school, Jessop’s approach (,
a, b, ) has been crucial in developing this
understanding. He uses regulation theory as a metho-
dological framework with which to analyse the profound
socio-economic changes that have occurred since the s,
and the location and role of the state, as a site of regulation,
in these changes. Jessop’s approach is important for our
purposes, for it recognises that the social and the economic
are inextricably linked through relationships between modes
of regulation and regimes of accumulation. Jessop (a,
b) demonstrates this in his theorisation of the shifting
state form and role from the Keynesian Welfare State ()
to the Schumpeterian Workfare State () or, more recently
(Jessop, ), from the Keynesian Welfare National State
() to the Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national Regime
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(). This approach suggests that the shift from
Keynesianism to neoliberalism has involved a re-regulation
of economy through mechanisms felt to be more ‘in tune’
with the neoliberal strategy, rather than its wholesale
deregulation (Jessop, a). In this sense, the idea of
‘workfarism’ provides a useful way of interrogating
developments in social policy, by focusing upon the way in
which the  subordinates social policy to the demands
of labour market ﬂexibility, and structural or systemic
competitiveness. Thus, while the  tried to extend the
social rights of its citizens, the  is concerned to provide
welfare services that benefit business, and it thereby demotes
individual needs to second place (ibid: ).
While it has been observed (Grover & Stewart, )
that this argument runs the risk of overstating short-term
change at the expense of longer-term continuity, the idea of
‘workfarism’ or ‘workfarist shifts’ has structured recent work
on the regulation of labour markets through employment
and social security policy (Peck, , ; Peck & Theodore,
; Grover, ). Peck and Theodore (), for
example, highlight ‘supply-side fundamentalism’ (a focus
upon the characteristics and behaviour of non-employed
people) as an important form of continuity between New
Labour and its Conservative predecessors. New Labour’s
interest in the supply side is widely recognised (Thompson,
; King & Wickham-Jones, ), and has led to the
claim that the ‘new orthodoxy in labour market policy’,
involving ‘both incentives and pressures to work in the context
of a laissez-faire approach to the demand side of the labour
market’ (Peck & Theodore, : ), has been consolidated
under New Labour.
Grover and Stewart (, ; see also Grover,
forthcoming) conceptualise this combination of financial
incentives and disciplinary measures to make non-employed
people take paid employment as ‘market workfare’, in order
to demonstrate the ways in which social security and labour-
market policy are being used to help reconstruct the reserve
army of labour.
They (Grover and Stewart, ) argue that this was
necessary because of a concern, mediated through
‘underclass’-type arguments, that non-employed people were
becoming so detached from labour markets that they no
longer had the economic eﬀect of maintaining downward
pressure on wages that they were supposed to have.
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It is in this context that we can begin to explain the
introduction and development of the , for it is held to be
central to the government’s welfare reform agenda,
particularly in relation to lone mothers (Harriet Harman
, then Secretary of State for Social Security, Social
Security Committee, , question ). In this context, we
can understand the  as an important element in the
workfarist shifts described by Jessop and others. In other
words, the  can be understood as being of benefit to
capital, demoting any appeal to individual ‘need’ to second
place. The main way in which the  is held to do this is
through its role in the re-structuring of a gendered reserve
army of labour.
Gendering the reserve army of labour
The industrial reserve army, during the periods of
stagnation and average prosperity, weighs down the active
army of workers; during periods of over-production and
feverish activity, it puts a curb on their pretensions.
(Marx, : )
What Marx meant by the ‘industrial reserve army’ was non-
employed people (those described as the ‘surplus population’
by classical political economists), who were displaced by
various economic processes, but who were available to labour
given the right economic circumstances. The reserve army,
Marx argued, had the specific function of keeping wage levels
and demands in check.
In conceptualising the reserve army of labour, Marx made
no distinction according to gender. From the s,
however, a number of feminist researchers began to question
the ways in which the reserve army might be structured
through gender. So, for example, in studying the supply of
labour during the Second World War, Summerfield ()
argued that the employment of women to meet the demands
of the war eﬀort represented the mobilisation of the reserve
army of labour. In now-familiar arguments, the development
of day nurseries was held to be a means of mobilising the
ﬂoating reserve as the state attempted to some extent to
become ‘housewife’ (ibid.).
Beechey (, ), focusing upon the relationship
between ‘the family’, the labour process and the reserve army,
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suggested that married women represented a reserve army,
because they could be paid a wage below the value of their
labour power, since they were partly reliant on sources of
income (i.e. their husbands) other than wages. She also
argued that married women provided a ﬂexible form of
labour that could be brought into production and dispensed
of, as and when economic conditions dictated: ‘married
women have a world of their very own, into which they can
disappear when discarded from production without being
eligible for state benefits’ (Beechey, : ). Bruegel’s
() focus upon ‘disposability’ had resonances of Beechy’s
work. Bruegel’s argument was also that married women could
be dispersed (disposed of), in times of economic slow-down,
to ‘the family’. Her evidence was that in industries where
both men and women worked, women faced higher and
increasing rates of unemployment compared to their male
colleagues.
However, the view of women as a reserve army of labour
was increasingly questioned from the s. Walby ()
summarised the criticisms when she argued that the ‘women
as reserve army’ thesis was structured through internal
contradictions. So, for instance, if women were cheaper to
employ compared to men, why would capital undermine its
own interests by disposing of their labour (rather than more
expensive male labour) during periods of economic slow-
down and recession? She also suggested that it was diﬃcult
to empirically sustain the ‘women as reserve army’ thesis,
citing the recession years of the s as an example of a
period of expansion in the number of females in paid
employment, while the number of employed men fell. Rees
(: ; see also Rubery & Tarling, ) argued that,
because of the ways in which labour markets are gender-
segregated, with women predominantly employed in certain
occupations in the services sector, and men dominating
manufacturing, the idea of ‘women as reserve army’ is diﬃcult
to sustain.
In later work focusing on part-time employment, Beechey
(Beechey & Perkins, : ) revised her position to argue
that the reserve army ‘concept is too imprecise, and has been
overloaded with too many diﬀerent meanings to be
particularly useful’. The focus of Beechey and Perkins was
on women and part-time employment. They examined the
ways in which employers construe part-time employment as
being ‘women’s work’, and concluded that part-time
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employment was a gender-specific means of gaining
ﬂexibility. Beechey and Perkins’s research suggested that
part-time employment was the result of employers’ practices
that are structured through gender. In other words, employers
demand part-time female labour in order to meet their own
requirements for ﬂexibility. In this interpretation, women
do not represent a reserve army of labour, but a form of
labour power that is to be exploited in diﬀerent ways to that
of men. Given the evidence of gender segregation in
employment, it is clear that the diﬀerent strategies of
exploitation take place in well-defined labour markets.
Critics of the ‘women as reserve army’ thesis essentially
argue that, on its own, it lacks the sophistication to be able
deal with the complexities of contemporary labour markets
(cf. Rubery, ). Such arguments, however, should not
distract us from the conceptual usefulness that the reserve
army idea still holds in relation to particular groups of
women. The main problem with the thesis is that it is too
broad. It has attempted to explain why women as a social
group are, on average, more likely to be employed in low-
paid and/or part-time sectors of labour markets compared
to men. It has also tried to do this when, often in contra-
distinction to their arguments, the importance of female
labour to the accumulation process, as measured by the
number of women in paid work, has increased. The ‘women
as reserve army of labour’ thesis is based upon the assumption
that women’s labour is not an established part of the
accumulation process, but is merely an adjunct to male labour
power. However, the experience of the post-World War Two
period has shown how the growth in female employment
means that such assumptions are unfounded. Massey (),
for example, demonstrates how, over the period from the
s to the s, women’s labour was sought out by British
industry. This meant ‘actively using spatial diﬀerences in
gender relations and between groups of women in their
attempts to get out of what has become the seemingly
perpetual weakness [in international competitiveness] of the
British economy’ (ibid: ). In particular, she demonstrates
the importance of the cheapness of female labour to emerging
accumulation strategies in areas where there was held to be
a plentiful supply of it (in mining areas, for example), and
in areas where wages were often supplemented by seasonal
work and/or self-employment among women (for example,
in Cornwall). Massey argued that females were increasingly
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becoming part of the core of the workforce. It is also the
case that economic restructuring towards the service sector
has increased the importance of female labour, ‘both because
of gender segregation by job task and because the often lower
pay and more ﬂexible contracts found particularly in private
services favour women’s employment’ (Rubery et al., :
). Female labour is clearly a crucial element in a neoliberal
accumulation process that is premised upon ﬂexibility and
internationalism (cf. Jessop, a, b).
The fact that there are well-established markets for female
labour has several implications for analysing the relationship
between women and the idea of the reserve army of labour.
First, it means that in relation to women, the reserve army
needs to be re-conceptualised in order to re-capture its
original meaning as outlined by Marx.
Whole social groups should not be seen as members of
the reserve army. Only those people who are not employed
should be considered as part of the reserve army. In our
case, it is of little conceptual use to think of women, as a
social group, as a reserve army of labour, for many do have
stable employment (although it is more likely to be part-
time and lower-paid than men’s). Only those women not
employed in the formal economy and receiving out-of-work
benefits—most notably lone mothers—should be considered
as the female reserve army. In other words, in analysing the
female reserve army a distinction must be made between
women with dependent children (mothers) and women with
no dependent children, for the latter are far more likely to
be in paid employment and working full-time (see Paull et
al., , table .).
A distinction must be also made between mothers with a
partner and lone mothers, for the latter are less likely to be
in paid employment at all, and if they are in employment
they are less likely to be working full time than the former
(ibid.). In addition, the state finds it diﬃcult to commodify
the labour power of partnered mothers because of their
assumed dependency upon their partners. Such mothers will
only be attracted into paid employment if, given their socio-
economic context, they feel that it is worth working in a
financial and/or social sense.
In contrast, and as we shall see, the state has discursive
and administrative levers (of which the  is one) through
which it is able to regulate the labour of benefit-dependent
lone mothers.
73The social regulation of lone mothers
Second, the female reserve army should be thought of as
a reserve army for labour markets that predominately employ
women. This point relates to the issues raised by Beechey
and Perkins () discussed above, and to those raised by
Layard (), which are discussed below. Beechey and
Perkins argued that female labour markets are constructed
by employers’ views of gender, while Layard argues that
one of the most important facets of the reserve army is the
closeness of its relationship to labour markets. In the broadest
sense, gender can be interpreted as an element in that
relationship between labour markets and the reserve army.
In other words, non-employed women do not have the reserve
army eﬀect of placing downward pressure on wages in labour
markets predominantly employing men because, as we have
seen in the work of Beechey and Perkins (), employers
use labour in diﬀerent ways according to its gender. In other
words, non-employed lone mothers should be considered as
a reserve army that helps to ensure that labour markets in
those sectors predominantly employing females do not
witness wage inﬂation.
Related to this point, and addressing another problem
with more ‘traditional’ configurations of the reserve army,
we also need to understand that the reserve army is not a
fixed group of people: it is ﬂuid, with a constant ﬂow of
individuals in and out of it. Understanding this is important,
because it changes the focus from a concentration on the status
of individuals to a concentration on the relationship between
the reserve army and labour markets. This allows a more critical
approach, questioning the closeness of the relationships
between the reserve army and the labour markets, and the
ways in which those relationships are manipulated in order
to maintain economic stability, particularly through state-
organised social policies.
Using this re-focused approach to understanding the
gendered nature of the reserve army of labour, it becomes
possible to argue that forms of long-term absence from
labour markets, other than just unemployment, also
undermine the reserve-army eﬀect. Such absence most
obviously includes lone motherhood.
With overall levels of employment among women
increasing in contemporary Britain, there is an economic
imperative to continually find ways of regulating the closeness
of the relationship between benefit-dependent lone mothers
and the labour markets that predominantly employ women.
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Before discussing this issue in relation to the , it is
necessary to make the case that New Labour’s welfare reform
agenda is concerned with regulating the reserve army of
labour.
New Labour and the reserve army of labour
While Marxist analyses are now seen as analytically worn
out by many social policy analysts (cf. Mullard & Spicker,
), the idea of the reserve army of labour’s having the
eﬀects that Marx described in relation to industrial capitalism
are still recognised by economists. So, for example, the New
Labour-favoured economist, Lord Layard (), notes how
unemployed people have a role to play in the suppression of
wage levels. However, his thinking takes him beyond the
idea that all that is required in order for the reserve army to
have its desired economic impact is its existence. In other
words, just having non-employed people is not enough to
guarantee downward pressure on wage inﬂation. What is as
important as having a reserve army is the closeness of the
relationship between non-employed people and labour
markets. He makes the point in relation to short-term and
long-term unemployment:
In any economy there has to be some short-term
unemployment to ease mobility and restrain wage pressure
by providing employers with a pool of workers able to
fill vacancies. But long-term unemployment appears to
be largely useless as it exerts very little downward pressure
on inﬂation. (ibid: )
Philpott (: ) argues that this is because employers
are reluctant to hire long-term unemployed people, rendering
them ‘virtually unemployable’. In such interpretations, it is
only short-term unemployment or economic inactivity that
has the eﬀect of maintaining downward pressure upon wages.
Longer-term inactivity has no such eﬀect in the contem-
porary informational economy. The skills of inactive people
are held to become obsolete, as their basic work discipline
and commitment to work are held to decrease.
In order to be eﬀective in its historical role in the manage-
ment of wage inﬂation, what seems to be more important in
contemporary society is the closeness of the relationship
75The social regulation of lone mothers
between the reserve army and labour markets, rather than just
the phenomenon of non-employment. This is an important point,
used by New Labour as a critique of Conservative government
policy in the s and early s. Under Conservative
regimes, and for various reasons related to the skills and
attitudes of non-employed people and the failure to reform
of the welfare state, New Labour believes that non-employed
people became increasingly detached from labour markets
(Brown, : ).
According to Brown (ibid.) this increased the Non-
Accelerating Inﬂation Rate of Unemployment (). The
aim of New Labour, therefore, has been to reduce the 
in order to enable more people to take paid employment
without increasing inﬂation. To do this, ‘the labour market
[is required] to work more eﬀectively’ ( Treasury, :
para. .). An eﬀective labour market is one in which labour
is ﬂexible and adaptable, and protected by ‘minimum
standards’ (ibid: para. .). It is in this context that it has
been observed that New Labour’s welfare reform programme
can be understood as consolidating the regulatory
mechanisms thought to be required in order to maintain
stability in neoliberal accumulation, since ensuring that
labour markets work ‘more eﬀectively’ in this way has
involved widespread change to social security and
employment policy (Peck, ; Grover & Stewart, ).
New Labour sees its welfare reform agenda as improving
the ‘eﬀective labour supply’.
With resonances of the work of Layard, New Labour has
been concerned with increasing both the size of the eﬀective
labour supply, and the closeness of its relationship to labour
markets. The idea of ‘reattaching’ non-employed people to
labour markets is crucial to understanding this approach
( Treasury, ). New Labour relates the re-attachment
of non-employed people to labour markets through the idea
of ‘employability’. For New Labour, ‘employability’ is related
to the skills and experience that individuals require in order
to ‘keep in touch with the labour market when they lose
their jobs, [to] continue to remain part of the eﬀective supply
of labour and avoid long-term dependency’ ( Treasury,
ibid: para. .). However, Grover () argues that the
idea of employability is more concerned with lowering the
costs of employing the reserve army through the subsidisation
of entry-level wages, in direct—placement fees from the
various New Deals—and indirect ways (tax credits, including
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the childcare tax credit). What is clear, though, is that New
Labour assigns the same role to ‘eﬀective labour supply’ as
Marx did to the reserve army:
The economy does not contain a fixed number of jobs.
One person’s employment should not be seen as another’s
worklessness. Instead by bringing workless people closer
to the labour market and making them more eﬀective at
competing for jobs, total employment can be increased.
With a more eﬀective supply of labour, employers can
fill their vacancies more easily and the economy can grow
without hitting skills shortages or running into
inﬂationary pressures. In a dynamic labour market, that
growth leads to higher employment. ( Treasury, :
para. .)
However, New Labour realises that diﬀerent strategies
are required in order to enable non-employed people of
diﬀerent social groups to take their places in the reserve
army. In other words, while the aim is to increase the size of
the reserve army and its closeness to labour markets, there
is recognition that there are barriers preventing specific social
groups from joining it.
As we have seen, in the case of women with dependent
children, it has been argued for many years that a lack of
childcare has represented a formidable barrier to them
making themselves available for employment. It is in this
context that we turn to focus upon the role of the  in the
regulation of the reserve army.
New Labour and the National Childcare Strategy:
Supply-side regulation, gender and the reserve army
of labour
A generation of parents has waited for the Government
to introduce a national childcare strategy. From this
Budget onwards, childcare will no longer be seen as an
afterthought, or a fringe element of social policies. From
now on, it will be seen, as it should be, as an integral part
of our economic policy.
(Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hansard, : col. ).
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The Chancellor’s comments place the National Childcare
Strategy firmly in the realm of economic policy and, as
Harker (: ) observes, it ‘now stands alongside other
major labour market issues’. The  is held to be an
important element of economic policy because it is
concerned with the regulation of a gendered reserve army:
For many families—especially lone parents—the costs of
childcare are a major obstacle to work. … In the past, the
problem of cost and access to good-quality child care
had denied many parents the opportunity to rejoin the
work force. Not only has that had an eﬀect on parents’
confidence in their own abilities, but it has denied Britain
a major pool of talent and potential. … We are determined
to ensure that no one is unable to take up work through
lack of access to aﬀordable, quality child care. (Dawn
Primarolo, Paymaster General, in Hansard, : col. )
For the Paymaster General, a lack of aﬀordable childcare
has essentially restricted the eﬀective supply of labour (reserve
army) and, in the context of New Labour’s welfare-reform
programme, this restriction needed to be addressed if
particularly lone mothers were to be able to more eﬀective-
ly compete for paid employment. Lone mothers can only be
considered to be part of the eﬀective supply of labour if, in
the view of the government, the main barrier to their
employment—their childcare needs—can be addressed.
From the s, the oﬃcial view was that lone mothers
should have a choice as to whether they work or not in the
formal economy (Department of Health and Social Security,
). However, a combination of social factors—for
example, the ‘decline of patriarchalism’ (Castells, ) since
the s, coupled with increases in divorce, cohabitation
and single motherhood—and economic factors, such as the
importance of female labour power to neoliberal accumu-
lation (Grover, forthcoming), has a led to a discernible shift
in attitudes towards lone mothers working in the formal
economy. While, in the s, the rhetoric was still about
choice, policy developments moved in the direction of
‘encouraging’ lone mothers into paid work, in what we have
seen Peck and Theodore () describe as the new
orthodoxy in labour market policy: the development of in-
work relief, latterly including the Childcare Tax Credit, as
the financial incentive to take paid employment, and the
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development of very direct forms of labour discipline, such
as the Single Work Focused Gateway (). The introduc-
tion of the  means that, for the first time in the post-
World War Two period, lone mothers are under the threat of
benefit refusal or reduction if they do not discuss paid
employment with agents of the state. As we have noted, this
combination of financial incentives to take paid employment
and labour discipline has been described as ‘market workfare’
(Grover & Stewart, ; Grover, forthcoming), in order to
denote the importance assigned to income maintenance and
labour market policy to neoliberal markets, and the
increasingly disciplinarian nature of such policies. The
importance of this argument, for our purposes, is that if
income maintenance and labour-market policy is to support
neoliberal accumulation, the financial incentives on oﬀer
have to be conjoined with compulsion in order to convince
those not in paid employment that they should be working
to secure their subsistence. In this context, the  should
be viewed as both a complementary policy to, and also part
of, market workfare, for it is aimed at creating more childcare
provision (complementary), but it is also aimed, through
the , at reducing the wage at which lone mothers might
consider working—a crucial element of the market workfare
agenda—by subsidising their childcare costs (see Grover &
Stewart, ).
There should be little doubt that in the workfarist shifts
in British social policy that have accompanied the
development of neoliberalism, lone mothers are now defined
as a reserve army of labour. This view of lone mothers can
be found in Labour documents from the mid-s. For
example, the Commission on Social Justice’s fifth condition
for maintaining full employment was ‘a reintegration of the
long-term unemployed into one labour market’, requiring
‘Help with childcare (especially for lone parents)’ (Borrie,
: ). Lone mothers are merely ‘long-term unemployed’
and, like the rest of the unemployed, their relationship to
labour markets was argued to be in need of being tightened:
The long-term aim should be to bring more parents within
the ‘availability for work’ rules.
At present, although men with children and working-age
adults without children are required to be available for
employment before they can claim benefit, lone parents
are not required to be available for work until their
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youngest child reaches the age of sixteen. The same is
true for partners in families with children receiving Income
Support or Family Credit. (ibid: )
The report goes on to note that:
[Once] our comprehensive strategy is in place to oﬀer
parents the help they need in returning to employment—
including, most important of all, good childcare facilities—
it would be both appropriate and desirable to expect
parents of older children to register as available for at
least part-time employment if they or their partners wished
to claim means-tested benefits. (ibid: )
While New Labour has not, as yet, gone as far as the
Commission on Social Justice Report suggested, in that lone
mothers are not expected to register as being available for
paid employment, policy developments such as the 
reﬂect New Labour’s desire for labour discipline (Gray, )
and its extension to an increasing number of client groups
(Grover, ). The development of the  also demonstrates
the importance that New Labour places upon the need for
childcare in order to release the labour power of lone mothers
(cf . Harman, in Hansard, : col. ). The
Neighbourhood Nurseries initiative is particularly aligned
to the childcare needs of lone mothers through its ambition
to oﬀer a childcare place to every lone parent entering
employment in the most disadvantaged areas.
There are at least two reasons for this alignment of
childcare with the needs of families headed by lone mothers.
The first relates to the main theme of this paper: that the
 is essentially about the re-regulation of a gendered reserve
army of labour. In this sense, there is greater scope for
increasing the size of the reserve army through focusing
policy developments on lone mothers, because a greater
proportion of them, compared to partnered mothers, are not
employed, a trend that became increasingly visible from the
s (see Moss et al., , table : ).
This diﬀerence in employment rates between lone and
partnered mothers was one of the justifications given by New
Labour for helping lone mothers with childcare and job-
search activities through the  and the New Deal for Lone
Parents (see Harriet Harman MP, then Secretary of State
for Social Security, Social Security Committee, :
Capital & Class #8580
question ). The government has set the ‘target that % of
lone parents [are] to be in work by ’. ( Treasury,
: para. .)
The second concern with lone mothers is a longer-term
concern with the social reproduction of labour power.
Duncan and Edwards () argue that the two most potent
discourses constructing lone motherhood are lone
motherhood as ‘social threat’, and lone motherhood as ‘social
problem’.
In the former, lone mothers are seen as ‘active agents’ in
the creation of the so-called ‘underclass’: ‘a developing class
that has no stake in the social order, is alienated from it and
hostile to it, and thus is the source of crime, deviancy and
social breakdown’ (ibid: ). In the case of the latter, ‘it is
social circumstances that are seen as placing both lone
mothers and their children in economically and socially
disadvantaged positions’. (ibid: )
From what we have read about New Labour so far, one
could be forgiven for thinking that it reﬂects upon, and helps
to construct, the ‘lone mother as social problem’ discourse.
However, Duncan and Edwards (ibid: ) rightly
recognise that the two discourses are not mutually exclusive,
in that, in the social problem discourse, ‘the absence of fathers
not only causes social disadvantages, but also results in social
deviancy, crime and hooliganism’. (ibid.)
It is this issue, which is essentially about the absence of
particular role models in families headed by lone mothers,
that links concerns about lone mothers to their labour-market
position. Of particular concern to policy-makers has been
the absence, in many households headed by lone mothers, of
a role model in paid employment (see Grover & Stewart,
; Grover, forthcoming).
Without this role model, it is felt that the worklessness of
households headed by lone mothers will merely be
transmitted to the next generation, thereby reproducing the
socio-economic disadvantage and threat of lone motherhood.
In other words getting lone mothers into paid employment
is held out as having longer-term eﬀects in disciplining
children into the ways of the free market:
The evidence is that a young girl who is brought up by a
lone mother who is working is less likely herself to become
a young lone mother than a young girl who is brought up
81The social regulation of lone mothers
by a lone mother who is not working. You can understand
why, of course, because it seems to be that life appears to
be like getting yourself up and getting yourself oﬀ to
work and that is the role model and example they set. So
I think there is a short term issue about returns, but then
there are also the long term issues about tackling a cycle
of dependency and parents being able to be role models.
(Harriet Harman , Education and Employment
Committee, : question )
While Harman may have justified her comments through
references to social exclusion (the social problem discourse),
in our context there are also direct concerns about future
possible constrictions upon the supply of labour, which are
linked to the social threat discourse. In this sense, and using
Hayekian ideas on the importance of families in the
transmission of traditional moralities, it has been noted that:
Reproduction of labour goes beyond the merely physical.
In neoliberal thought, ‘the family’ is crucial for the
transmission of the rules and roles which individuals will
need as adults in the free market: in particular, children
should learn their role as labour. In lone parent families
headed by women, only the women can teach their
children that role. (Grover & Stewart : )
This focus upon social reproduction is important for thinking
about the longer-term aims of the , and its position within
New Labour’s wider welfare reform agenda. However, it
also provides an opportunity to focus on wider relationships
between capital and childcare, including the development
of childcare as a capitalist enterprise.
Childcare, social reproduction and capitalism
Through focusing on the role of childcare in producing a
gendered reserve army of labour, this paper has outlined
the importance assigned to the  in the neoliberal
accumulation process. This has demonstrated the importance
of childcare to production. However, it is possible to argue
that the  is also important to production because of its
role in the socialisation of social reproduction through state-
sponsored benefits and services.
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The socialisation of reproduction in this way benefits
capital, because it once again helps to make labour as cheap
as possible to employ. This point is related to Gough’s (:
-) argument that one of the two roles of state welfare
benefits and services is ‘to modify the reproduction of labour
power’ (original italics) and Picchio’s (: ) observation
‘that the more labour is embodied in its reproduction the
less it costs the employer’.
In the case of childcare, there are at least two benefits
that come from the intervention of the state via the .
First, the costs of reproduction are subsidised by the state,
meaning that employers do not have to consider increasing
wages in order to ensure that their female employees can
aﬀord childcare. Second, the involvement of the state in the
childcare aspects of the reproduction process actually means
that capital is relieved of the need to invest in its own
childcare services to recruit and retain staﬀ.
Meeting the Childcare Challenge (Secretary of State for
Education and Employment et al., : ) notes that:
‘Employers are key to the success of the National Childcare
Strategy and we want to ensure they are fully aware of the
business benefits of family friendly policies’. Employers do
seem to be aware of the benefits of such policies, with 
per cent agreeing that ‘people work best when they can
balance their work with other aspects of their lives’ (Secretary
of State for Education and Employment, , cited in
Strategy Unit, : ).
However, when it comes to providing childcare support,
‘eﬀorts to increase their [employers’] involvement have so
far met with limited success’ (Strategy Unit, : ). It is
now recognised that the main ‘stakeholder’ missing from
debates about childcare are employers with, for example,
only  per cent of employers providing workplace childcare
facilities and only  per cent subsidising nursery places
(ibid.).
This means that those sectors of capital that are reliant
upon female labour are benefiting from having their
production costs subsidised by institutional and individual
taxpayers, and National Lottery game-players, the poorer
of whom we know to spend more of their income playing
such games (Sproston, , tables . and .). In other
words, the funding arrangements for childcare mean that
those sectors of capital employing mothers with dependent
children are essentially being subsidised by those sectors of
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capital that do not have large numbers of such employees,
and by those individuals that do not have children.
In some analyses, this might be welcomed as a transference
of resources from men to women, and from those without
dependent children to those with children. However, it is
equally the case that female workers, including those who
are mothers and paying for formal childcare themselves, are
subsidising the production costs of capital through  which,
along with New Labour’s wider welfare-reform agenda, helps
to institutionalise the split between the costs of production
and reproduction.
So far, this paper has been concerned with the role of the
state in the socialisation of childcare as part of the social
reproduction process, and the benefits to capital that this
brings. However, with the emphasis being upon the private
sector as the main provider of childcare, we can also examine
childcare as part of production, for it is a commodity
produced in competitive markets for the consumption of
parents who want, or who are ‘encouraged’ by the state, to
take paid employment. Through the , the state has been
heavily involved in the promotion and subsidisation of
childcare as a commodity, the production of which can be
highly lucrative.
It is estimated that in , the  childcare market (day-
nurseries, childminders and nannies) was worth some £
billion per annum (Sketchley, , table : ). There has
been particularly rapid growth in the nursery sector, where
it is estimated that the market was worth £ million in
, rising to a little over £ billion by , with growth
of around  per cent per annum in the first half of the
s, and between  and  per cent in the second half
(Blackburn, : -). It is predicted that ‘[g]rowth in
the children’s nurseries market is likely to remain strong’
because ‘childcare demand remains high, and the government
is committed to further funding’. (ibid: )
The majority of children’s nurseries are stand-alone
enterprises operated by sole traders or partnerships. It is
estimated that, in terms of the number of places, only about
 per cent of the nursery market is controlled by what are
defined as ‘major providers’ (those owning or managing three
or more nurseries). (ibid: )
However, it is thought that future growth in nurseries is
likely to come from such providers as they seek to exploit
economies of scale and scope, through expansion by
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consolidation and/or the building of new nurseries (ibid:
-). Related to this point, evidence of global interest in
the ’s childcare markets is beginning to emerge. So, for
example, in the year  the American company Bright
Horizons Family Solutions Inc. entered the day-nursery
market in the , through the purchase of the Nurseryworks
chain of nurseries (Blackburn, ), while Asquith Court
School Ltd (the largest provider of day-nurseries in the )
was bought by West Private Equity, a global investment bank,
in  (Sketchley, ).
There is confidence that childcare markets are worth
investing in. So, for example, venture capitalists, who typically
look for a ‘return on equity of approximately -%
compounded over a - year period’ (ibid: ), have taken
an increasing interest in the nursery market. They are
encouraged by the profitability of some of the main providers.
In /, for instance, the Happy Childcare group of
nurseries reported pre-tax profits of . per cent of revenue,
while Asquith Court reported pre-tax profit of . per cent
of revenue (ibid: table .: -). Not all nursery chains
reported such healthy levels of profit in /, but losses
made by major day-nursery providers were due to the
relatively high start-up costs of opening nurseries in a period
of rapid expansion. However, it is noted (Blackburn, :
) that in the ‘current climate, investors, and nursery
businesses are optimistic about future financial and
operational performance’.
As with most capitalist enterprises, the main cost to
childcare providers is wages. It is estimated, for example,
that between  and  per cent of revenue in day-nurseries
is used to pay wages (Blackburn, : vi), while the Daycare
Trust (cited in Sketchley, : ) estimates that  per
cent of the running costs of day-nurseries are accounted for
by wages.
However, given the profits, as outlined above, which some
nursery providers are making, it is clear that capital is able
to extract a fairly healthy level of surplus value from childcare
workers. The childcare sector is notorious for its low rates
of pay, a fact emphasised by market analysts for potential
investors (for example, Sketchley, ; Blackburn, ).
There are two, related reasons for this. First, the vast majority
(- per cent) of the childcare workforce is female
(Cameron et al., ), and we know that female employees
are poorly paid compared to men (Equal Opportunities
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Commission, : ). Second, Cameron et al. (ibid: )
link the predominance of women working in childcare to
what Singer () describes as ‘attachment pedagogy’: ‘the
idea that mother care is needed for secure development and
argues that, in its absence, non-maternal care needs to be
modelled on a dyadic mother-child relationship’. In this line
of thinking, what children in childcare require is substitute
mothering.
What attachment pedagogy actually does though, is to
help to reproduce the idea that caring work is ‘natural’ for
women and that, being part of their biological profile, it is
not a very valuable commodity. This translates into very
low levels of wages for childcare workers. Using Labour
Force Survey data, for example, Cameron et al. () found
that the average earnings of childcare workers, at £. per
hour, was only about two-thirds of the average (£. per
hour) for all female workers.
New Labour has set a target ( per cent by ) for
getting more men employed in childcare. However, the idea
that childcare work is ‘women’s work’ was reproduced in
the literature outlining the  in discussion of the potential
use of welfare reform to commodify the labour power of
lone mothers:
Parents, particularly lone parents, are a key potential
source of childcare and play workers. Parents should be
encouraged to recognise the skills they acquire as parents
as they bring up their own children. These skills stand
them in good stead to take up training as childcare
workers. (Secretary of State for Education and Employ-
ment et al., : para. .)
There was recognition that potential childcare workers
might need some persuasion that childcare work was for
them, and it was therefore suggested that up to ,
childcare workers could be supplied to employers through
the New Deals (ibid: para. .). In other words, the
government was contemplating creating a supply of labour
for childcare enterprises from the very group—lone
mothers—that it thought had the most to gain from the .
While the government did recognize that childcare work
was a skilled occupation, those skills were held to be gender-
specific to mothers, and in this particular case, more
specifically lone mothers.
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Conclusion
Capital has a great deal to gain from the introduction and
development of the . We have seen that the  should be
analysed as part of the shift towards workfarism that we have
witnessed over the past two decades or so, for it aims to help
consolidate neoliberal accumulation by helping to
commodify the labour power of particularly lone mothers,
thereby helping to ensure eﬀective competition in the labour
markets that mainly employ women. In addition to the
benefits this brings such sectors of capital in restraining
wage costs in a general sense, the socialisation of reproduction
through the  also helps to constrain wage costs, by
divesting capital of any responsibility that it might be felt to
have towards the longer-term reproduction of labour power.
In addition, because it is held by the state that the private
sector is the best source of delivery for the socialised aspects
of childcare, the  has been particularly beneficial for
childcare enterprises, which are eﬀectively being subsidised
by workers and other working-class people.
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